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State Practice in the Management and
Allocation of Transboundary Groundwater
Resources in North America

Gabriel Eckstein and Amy Hardberger
I . I N T RO DUC T ION

In recent years, groundwater has garnered growing attention as a significant
source of freshwater. Groundwater is currently the most extracted natural
resource in the world with a global withdrawal rate of 600–700 cubic
kilometres per year.1 In Europe, groundwater accounts for 60–99 percent
of drinking water, while, throughout the United States, the percentage
ranges from 50–97 percent.2 In some rural areas, groundwater meets nearly
100 percent of users’ daily needs.3 As water demands continue to increase
globally so will the dependence on groundwater. This increased reliance
presents challenges because many aquifers are subject to waste, contamination, overexploitation, and other maladies that threaten hundreds of aquifers worldwide and make the need for agreements even more necessary.4
These challenges are especially evident in the international context.
Historically, the significance of groundwater as a source of freshwater was disregarded, its hydrological dynamics misunderstood, and its
management inconsistent and sometimes irrational. As a result, or possibly
another symptom, groundwater resources received considerably less attention in international law and relations among nations than have surface
waters.5 Today, while a growing body of international law governs transboundary rivers and lakes worldwide, a gap in the law means that virtually

1 See S.S.D. Foster and P.J. Chilton, Groundwater: The Processes and Global Significance of
Aquifer Degradation 358 Phil. Trans. Royal Soc’y London B: Biological Sciences 1957 (2003),
<http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1693287&blobtype=pdf>; see also
Water for People, Water for Life, the United Nations World Water Development Report, at
78 (2003).
2 G. Eckstein and Y. Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground
Water Resources and International Law 19 Amer. U. Int’l L. Rev. 201 at 202 (2003).
3 Texas Water Development Board 2 Water for Texas 13 (2007).
4 See G. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission’s Draft Articles
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers 18 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 537 at 539, n. 7 (2007)
(providing examples of overexploitation and degradation of aquifers worldwide).
5 Eckstein and Eckstein, supra note 2 at 222–31.
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no widely accepted international norms govern transboundary aquifers.6
This gap, however, may be slowly fi lling as a result of the development of
customary law, which is traceable, in large part, to the conduct of subnational actors.
International law is generally understood to emerge from formal and direct
lawmaking actions by the larger international community. Treaties and conventions adopted by states represent formally accepted and codified norms of
international law.7 Another source of international law is defined by customary international law. Customary international law is international law that
emerges from a broad and consistent practice of states justified by a belief
that such conduct is legally appropriate and mandated.8 In the case of transboundary groundwater resources, while few formal international instruments
focus on transboundary aquifers,9 a growing number of subnational practices around the world suggest an emerging trend in the management of transboundary groundwater resources. Subnational political units are engaging
in arrangements addressing the management of aquifers that traverse their
international boundaries. In the European context, where most small international transboundary aquifers are now managed directly by local authorities under local transboundary arrangements,10 this trend appears more
formalized because of the European Outline Convention on the Transfrontier
Cooperation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (European
Outline Convention), which authorizes subnational units to enter into transboundary arrangements under certain circumstances.11 In contrast, in North
America, the respective federal governments have provided little if any guidance for, or shown any interest in, such local initiatives. Nonetheless, even in
North America, it is safe to say that transboundary groundwater resources
are now legitimate subjects for international cooperation.12
6

See generally Eckstein, supra note 4.
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, at 11–12 (5th edn, 1998); see
also Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1060, Article 38(1)(a),
<http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0>.
8 See generally Brownlie, supra note 7 at 4–11; see also Statute of the International Court
of Justice, supra note 7, Article 38(1)(b).
9 See Eckstein and Eckstein, supra note 2 at 224–7.
10 Jochen Sohnle, Transboundary Aquifers and Local Transfrontier Co-operation in Europe,
unpublished report prepared for the UNILC Special Rapporteur, His Excellency, Ambassador
Chusei Yamada and the UNESCO Ground Water Experts Group, February 2006 [on fi le with
authors].
11 European Outline Convention on the Transfrontier Cooperation between Territorial
Communities or Authorities (21 May 1980), 20 I.L.M. 315 (1981) [European Outline
Convention]. This purpose of this treaty is to encourage and facilitate trans-border cooperation between communities or authorities on both sides of an international boundary on
issues relevant to both sides, especially in the fields of ‘regional, urban and rural development, environmental protection, the improvement of public facilities and services and mutual
assistance in emergencies’ (ibid. at Preamble).
12 Cf. G. Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of Ground Water Resources
Under the UN Watercourse Convention 30 Columbia J. of Envt’l Law 525 at 528–9 (2005)
7
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The purpose of this article is to investigate more closely this trend and
to identify specific concepts resulting from such local initiatives that might
serve as a basis for customary international law. While it is not intended as
a comparative study in relation to the European experience, it presents the
North American experience in a way that should be informative for such an
inquiry in the future. Specifically, this article focuses on the governance of
transboundary groundwater resources in North America. It begins by identifying and reviewing various arrangements over transboundary aquifers
between Mexico and the United States, between Canada and the United
States, and between the continental states of the United States.13 Although
the arrangements discussed in this article represent diverse geographic and
geologic conditions, commonalities in norms and principles can be identified in areas such as cooperation, prior notification of planned activities,
sharing of data and information, public participation, and a preference for
subsidiarity and local solutions for local issues.
This article proposes that many of these commonalitites evidence
emerging state practice and should be considered and evaluated as bases
for emerging customary international law. Moreover, recent trends suggest a change in the function of regional agreements and their role in the
development of international custom as evidenced by the growing importance and effectiveness of local and regional transboundary arrangements14
that are tailored to local characteristics and circumstances. Significantly,
these trends are especially unique in that the majority of the arrangements
identified are unofficial pacts without formal endorsement of the respective governments. Additionally, of those arrangements, the vast majority
are subnational pacts rather than pacts between national governments.
Ultimately, in identifying and characterizing such commonalities and
characteristics, as well as the experiences on which they are based, this
study aims to offer insight into evolving customary international law as
well as suggestions for the development of new arrangements related to the
management of transboundary groundwater resources.

(asserting that internationally shared groundwater resources are now ‘a legitimate subject of
international law’).
13 Full text versions of all of the agreements discussed in this article can be found at <http://
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
14 As used in this article, the phrase ‘local and regional transboundary arrangements’
denotes agreements over freshwater resources that traverse a political boundary. This
includes arrangements between entities in different countries as well as those between subnational units. The term ‘arrangement’ is used to encompass agreements that may be those that
are officially or formally recognized by the respective governments as well as those that are
either informal or non-binding agreements or those not formally recognized by the respective
sovereign. An example of the latter is an internationally transboundary waters arrangement
entered into by local entities on either side of a political border but which are not officially
recognized by the respective national governments.
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I I. T H E A R R A NGEMEN TS

1. Mexico–United States Border
The problems that can arise from an international shared resource are
clearly seen on the border between the United States and Mexico. The
Mexico-US border extends more than 3,100 kilometres from the Gulf of
Mexico to the Pacific Ocean15 and overlies as many as twenty aquifers that
traverse the international boundary.16 No formal federal agreements exist
between Mexico and the United States addressing the management, allocation, or protection of any of the border aquifers. However, a number of
instruments encourage and facilitate cooperation between the two nations
at the local and at the national levels in the management of transboundary
aquifers.
A. Minutes of the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC)
The IBWC is a bi-national commission, composed of a Mexican and a
United States section, responsible for enforcing water treaties and settling
disputes on the Mexico-US border.17 The commission’s current structure
and water mandate originates with the 1944 Treaty between the United
States of America and Mexico Relating to the utilization of the Waters of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (1944 US-Mexico
Treaty).18 The IBWC implements its mandate and commitments through the
formulation of minutes. Minutes are decisions or recommendations of the
IBWC, which, once approved by both governments, become binding obligations on the countries.19
15 See D. Woodward and R. Durall, United States-Mexico Border Area, as Delineated by
a Shared-Water Resources Perspective, U.S. Dept. of the Interior Field Coordinating Fact
Sheet 1, February 1996, <http://www.cerc.usgs.gov/FCC/pubs/Fact_sheets/Fact_1/DOI_
US-MX_Border_FCC_Fact_sheet_1.html>.
16 See Good Neighbor Environmental Board, Water Resources Management on the U.S.Mexico Border, Eighth Report to the President and the Congress of the United States (2005),
<http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/gneb8threport/gneb8threport.pdf> (identifying twenty
aquifers on the border); and S. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities
for Managing Transboundary Ground water on the Mexico-U.S. Border 40 Nat. Resources J.
341 at 344 and 363–77 (2000) (identifying eighteen aquifers on the border).
17 S. Mumme, Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical
Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico 33
Nat. Res. J. 93 at 94–5 (1993).
18 Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico Relating to the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, and supplementary protocol, 59 Stat. 1219 (14 November 1944).
19 Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional
Responsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 Nat. Resources J.
397 at 398 (1993).
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Minute 242 of the IBWC was enacted in August 1973.20 It was designed
to address the increasing salinity of the Colorado River and requires the
United States to deliver water of a minimum water salinity level to Mexico.
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Minute 242 also address groundwater in the border
region. To the extent that these paragraphs create binding obligations, they
represent the only evidence of a formal agreement between Mexico and the
United States on the region’s transboundary aquifers. Paragraph 5 provides
that, pending the development of a ‘comprehensive’ groundwater agreement
for the border region, both countries agree to limit groundwater pumping
within a precisely defined geographic region along the Arizona-Sonora
border near San Luis to specifically enumerated withdrawal targets.21
Imposing a more aspirational obligation, paragraph 6 requires both countries to consult each other prior to pursuing any new development of surface
or groundwater resources, or any other action, that could adversely impact
the other country. This obligation, drafted with the stated goal of ‘avoiding
future problems,’ applies to all transboundary aquifers along the border.22
Another agreement that is relevant to the border’s groundwater resources
is Minute 289.23 Enacted in November 1992, it is designed to address water
quality in the lower Rio Grande River along the Mexico-US border. Although
the majority of the minute focuses on the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers,
paragraph 4 references the Integrated Border Environmental Plan adopted
by Mexico and the United States in 1992 and calls for the establishment of
a water monitoring program and database to observe surface and groundwater quality along the US-Mexico border. The paragraph also lists those
agencies on both sides of the border that are to participate in the joint monitoring program.24
B. Memorandum of Understanding between City of Juárez,
Mexico Utilities and the El Paso Water Utilities Public Services
Board of the City of El Paso, Texas (Juárez-El Paso MOU)25
The Hueco Bolson Aquifer, which underlies the border sister cities of
Juárez, Chihuahua, in Mexico and El Paso, Texas, in the United States,
20 Minute 242: Permanent and Defi nite Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity
of the Colorado River, International Boundary and Water Commission (30 August 1974),
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Minute 242].
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Minute 289: Observation of the Quality of the Waters Along the United States and
Mexico Border, International Boundary and Water Commission (11 December 1992), <http://
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
24 Ibid.
25 Memorandum of Understanding between City of Juárez, Mexico Utilities and the El
Paso Water Utilities Public Services Board of the City of El Paso, Texas (6 December 1999)
[Juárez-El Paso MOU], <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>.
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serves as a principal source of freshwater for both communities: nearly
100 percent for Juárez, and approximately 30 percent for El Paso.26 As a
result of this dependence, the aquifer has undergone considerable mining in
recent decades, and concerns have been raised over the aquifer’s viability as
an ongoing source of freshwater for the region.
In an effort to generate cooperation over the management and
exploitation of the Hueco Bolson, the municipal utility companies of
the two cities entered into a legally non-binding memorandum of understanding in 1999. This arrangement focuses on the region’s groundwater
by ‘seek[ing] to identify the mechanisms between the parties to increase
communications, cooperation, and implementation of transboundary
projects of common interest.’ In its stated goals of ‘general objectives,’ the
Juárez-El Paso MOU alludes to data and information sharing related to
transboundary natural resources and to cooperation in the management,
use, and protection of natural resources that traverse an international
boundary.27
C. United States of America and the United Mexican States
Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement)28
The La Paz Agreement promotes cooperation for environmental protection
on the border. While the agreement is not directly related to groundwater
resources, it does contain general language that implicates transboundary
aquifers. The treaty obligates both parties to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
sources of pollution in their respective territory where such pollution affects
the others’ border region; cooperate in addressing environmental problems
of mutual interest; and coordinate practical, legal, institutional, and technical measures designed to protect environmental quality in the border
area, including coordinating national programs, scientific and educational
exchanges, environmental monitoring, environmental impact assessment,
and regular exchanges of data and information on transboundary pollution
originating in each country’s territory.29 It is noteworthy that none of the
provisions in this agreement can prejudice or otherwise affect existing or
26 Final Report: Second Coordination Workshop, UNESCO/OAS ISARM Americas
Programme—Transboundary Aquifers of the Americas, El Paso, Texas, 10–12 November
2004 (2005), <http://www.oas.org/usde/isarm/Documents/English/ISARM%20Americas%
202004-%20El%20Paso%20Workshop%20Report.pdf>.
27 Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25.
28 United States of America and the United Mexican States Agreement on Cooperation
for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (14 August
1983), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [La Paz
Agreement].
29 Ibid., Article 2 and 3.
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future agreements concluded between the United States and Mexico including those relating to the region’s waters.30
D. United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act31
The United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act was
designed to address the lack of consensus between the two nations on the
source and availability of future water supplies along the border. The Act
mandates the creation of a scientific program to comprehensively assess
the region’s transboundary aquifers, especially those deemed to be priority transboundary aquifers.32 The program is also expected to develop the
scientific foundation for national, state, and local officials to address pressing water resource challenges in the region. It directs the secretary of the
US Department of the Interior to implement this program in cooperation
with the IBWC, the three participating US border states of Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas, certain water resources research institutes, affected
Indian tribes, and other appropriate federal and state agencies. While the
Act itself is not a transboundary arrangement, it does obligate the secretary, ‘to the maximum extent practicable,’ to work with all of these entities
‘to develop partnerships with, and receive input from, relevant organizations in Mexico to carry out the program.’33 The Act was signed into law in
December 2006. While it is authorized to be funded for up to US $50 million
over its ten-year life span, it was initially funded for US $1 million in early
2008.34
The Act specifically provides that it shall not affect: (1) the jurisdiction or
responsibility of a participating state with respect to managing its surface
or groundwater resources; (2) the water rights of any person or entity using
water from a transboundary aquifer; or (3) state water law or an interstate
30

Ibid., Article 18.
United States–Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Public Law 109–448,
120 Stat. 3328–3332, issued on 22 December 2006, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
32 Ibid. at sec. 4.
33 Ibid. at sec. 4 and 5. According to the US Geological Survey at the US Department of
Interior, one of the agencies tasked with implementing this act, ‘[e]arly into the program, it
would be essential that binational consensus be reached on common investigative approaches,
common field data collection protocols, laboratory methodologies, and data management,
documentation, and reporting systems. Once these technical issues are resolved, it would be
much easier to streamline the treaty requirements related to the review and public release of
impartial, transboundary scientific data. Such consensus has been reached in the past for
transboundary investigations having limited scope. Obtaining this consensus for the entire
Border region would greatly enhance transboundary scientific collaboration in the future.’
Statement of Charles G. Groat, Director, US Geological Survey, US Department of the
Interior, to the Subcommittee on Water and Power, US Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resource, 19 May 2004.
34 Ibid. at sec. 8; US Geological Survey, FY 2008 Budget Funding Tables, <http://www.
usgs.gov/budget/2008/08funding_tables.asp>.
31
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compact or international treaty governing water. The Act also states that it
shall not delay or alter the implementation or operation of any works within
the territorial limits of the United States relating to the waters governed by
the 1944 US-Mexico Treaty.35
2. Canada-US Border
As expansive as the Mexico-US border is, the border region between Canada
and the United States is more than three times that length—approximately
11,370 kilometres. While this border region is also marked by diverse climates and geography, it contains far greater quantities of freshwater and
nearly 300 transboundary waterways and aquifers. Unlike the Mexico-US
region, Canada and the United States do not compete for groundwater
resources primarily because of the abundance of surface water in the
region.36 Today, no formal agreement exists between the two nations directly addressing transboundary groundwater resources along the common
border. Nonetheless, a number of agreements at various levels of government are relevant to transboundary aquifers.
A. Canada-US Agreements
The fi rst in a series of treaties relating to boundary waters between Canada
and the United States, the 1909 Treaty between the United States and Great
Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising between the
United States and Canada provides the principles and mechanisms for
preventing and resolving disputes over water quality and quantity along
the Canadian-US boundary (Boundary Waters Treaty).37 To achieve these
goals, the treaty establishes the International Joint Commission (IJC),
an independent bi-national organization created to prevent and resolve
disputes relating to the use and quality of boundary waters along the
Canadian-US border.38
Although groundwater is not directly mentioned in the treaty, Article IV
prohibits both countries from allowing ‘boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary [to] be polluted on either side to the injury of health
or property on the other.’39 While the definition of ‘boundary waters’ limits
the term to surface waters, the article appears to contemplate other types
of flowing waters. Nevertheless, the Canadian government, through their
35

Ibid. at sec. 6.
A. Rivera, Trans-Boundary Water in Canada, paper presented at the thirty-third
International Association of Hydrogeologists Congress, Zacatecas, Mexico, 11–15 October
2004 [on fi le with author].
37 Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters, and
Questions Arising between the United States and Canada (11 January 1909), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Boundary Waters Treaty].
38 Ibid., Articles. 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10.
39 Ibid. at 4.
36
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embassy in Washington, DC, has explicitly indicated that they do not interpret the treaty as encompassing groundwater resources.40
Groundwater, however, is considered in the Great Lake Water Quality
Agreement (Great Lake Agreement), which was signed under the auspices
of the IJC on 22 November 1978.41 Although predominantly a surface water
agreement, a number of the provisions refer to groundwater both expressly
and impliedly. For example, Article VI(q) of the Great Lake Agreement,
which is entitled ‘Programs and Other Measures,’ provides express reference to groundwater by requiring the parties to ‘develop and implement
programs and other measures to fulfill the purpose of [the] agreement,’
including formulating ‘programs for the assessment and control of contaminated groundwater and subsurface sources entering’ the waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the IJC.42 Annex 16 to the treaty, entitled ‘Pollution
from Contaminated Groundwater,’ provides additional details on the specifics of the program, including identifying existing and potential sources
of contaminated groundwater; mapping hydrogeological conditions of
groundwater; developing a standard approach and procedure for sampling
and analyzing groundwater to assess contamination and estimate contaminant loading from groundwater to the Great Lakes; and controlling
contamination.43 In addition, while not an explicit reference, Article 1 of
the Great Lake Agreement offers a definition for the ‘Great Lakes System,’
which reasonably can be interpreted to encompass related groundwaters.
Article 1 defines the term as all ‘streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of
water that are within the drainage basin on the St. Lawrence River.’44 While
the focus of the Great Lake Agreement is on the surface waters of the Great
Lakes, the language of the agreement provides both explicit and implicit
obligations with regard to groundwater related to the Great Lakes that
could impact the lakes through pollution.
B. Great Lakes Charter and Its Progeny
On 11 February 1985, two Canadian provinces (Ontario and Quebec) and
eight US states (Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) signed the Great Lakes Charter: Principles
for the Management of Great Lakes Water Resources (Great Lakes

40 Website of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC, <http://geo.international.gc.ca/
can-am/washington/shared_env/q_a-en.asp> at Q12 (providing questions and answers on
‘An Act to Amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act’).
41 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the U.S. and Canada (22 November
1978), 30 U.S.T. 1384, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>.
42 Ibid., Article VI(q) [emphasis added].
43 Ibid. at Annex 16.
44 Ibid., Article 1.
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Charter).45 While not legally binding, the Great Lakes Charter establishes
a basis for the cooperative management of the Great Lakes founded on an
understanding that the Great Lakes Basin should be ‘recognized and treated
as a single hydrologic system’ and ‘the natural resources and ecosystem of
the Basin should be considered as a unified whole.’ Significantly, it explicitly recognizes groundwater as an integral component of the Great Lakes
Basin and encourages the parties to consider groundwater resources in all
activities related to the basin. Moreover, it defi nes ‘withdrawal’ from the
basin as ‘the removal or taking of water from surface or groundwater.’46
The Great Lakes Charter commits all of the parties to cooperate at all
levels of government to ‘the study, monitoring, planning, and conservation
of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin.’ It emphasizes that the parties’ ‘shared responsibility to conserve and protect the water resources of the
Great Lakes Basin for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of all their citizens’
and urges them to implement appropriate legislation. Moreover, it recognizes the intent of the parties to notify and consult all relevant provinces
and states prior to approving a permit or major new or increased diversion or consumptive use of Great Lakes waters. Finally, the Great Lakes
Charter commits the parties to develop and exchange data and information,
to coordinate relevant research efforts, and, more specifically, to generate
an inventory of the basin’s surface and groundwater resources.47
In the late 1990s, a process was initiated to strengthen the objectives of
the Great Lakes Charter culminating in the Great Lakes Charter Annex,
A Supplementary Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter (Annex 2001).48
While also non-binding, the Annex 2001 commits the parties to develop a
basin-wide binding arrangement based on a broad-based public participation program, the goal of which is to ‘protect, conserve, restore, improve,
and manage [the] use of the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural Resources
of the Great Lakes Basin.’49
The result of the Annex 2001’s commitments was the Great Lakes–St.
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement (Great
Lakes Agreement), which was signed by the governors of the eight US states
and the premiers of the two Canadian provinces on 13 December 2005.50
The agreement establishes a ‘Decision Making Standard for Management
45 Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management
of Great Lakes Water Resources (11 February 1985), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Great Lakes Charter].
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Charter Annex, A Supplementary
Agreement to the Great Lakes Charter (18 June 2001), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.
org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
49 Ibid.
50 Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement
(13 December 2005), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html> [Great Lakes Agreement].
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of Withdrawals and Consumptive Uses,’ which is applicable to new water
withdrawals and to increases to existing withdrawals over a set minimum
volume.51 Furthermore, it also strengthens the collection and sharing of
technical data among the states and provinces and requires that the parties
submit their water management programs implementing the compact for
periodic review.52
Significantly, the Great Lakes Agreement directly encompasses groundwater resources within its scope. It defines ‘water’ as ‘ground or surface water
contained within the [Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River] basin’ and defines
‘waters of the basin or basin water’ as ‘the Great Lakes and all streams,
rivers, lakes, connecting channels and other bodies of water, including tributary groundwater, within the Basin.53 Under the agreement, though, the
basin’s surface water divide is used ‘for the purpose of managing and regulating new or increased diversions, consumptive uses or withdrawals of . . .
groundwater.’54
While the Great Lakes Agreement is not intended to become a treaty and is
not pursued at the national levels, the signatories have indicated their strong
commitment to its terms. The Quebec national assembly has approved the
agreement, while Ontario has actually incorporated the agreement into its
domestic laws.55 On the US side, the eight Great Lakes states are currently
pursuing a parallel initiative—the Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact (Great Lakes Compact)56 —which incorporates
and would make the Great Lakes Agreement binding on the states.57 As of
3 July 2008, Pennsylvania became the final Great Lakes state to sign the
compact.58 All that remains for it to enter into force is for the US Congress
to review and approve the arrangement in accordance with its responsibility
under the US Constitution.59

51

52 See ibid. at sec. 1.3(2)(e) and 3.4.
Ibid. at sec. 4.10 and 4.11.
Ibid., Article 103 [emphasis added].
54 Ibid., Article 207.
55 See Implementation, Great Lakes–St. Lawrence River Water Resources Regional
Body website, <http://www.glslregionalbody.org/AgreementImplementationStatus.aspx>
[Implementation].
56 Council of Great Lakes Governors, The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact (13 December 2005), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Great Lakes Compact].
57 See Implementation, supra note 55.
58 See PA on Course to OK Pact to Protect Great Lakes, Chicago Tribune, 3 July 2008,
<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-ap-pa-xgr-greatlakescom,0,5648987.story>; see
also Implementation, supra note 55.
59 Under the US Constitution, a compact between US states must be approved by the US
Congress before it can enter into force. Once congressional approval is obtained, a compact
carries the force of federal US law. US Const. art. 1 § 10, Clause 3. For additional discussion
pertaining to compacts between US states addressing transboundary groundwater resources,
see notes 66–83 in this article and accompanying text.
53
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C. Arrangements between the Canadian Province of
British Columbia and the US State of Washington
Several regional arrangements are found along the US-Canadian border. One
is the 1992 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Province
of British Columbia and the State of Washington (British ColumbiaWashington Agreement), which created the British Columbia-Washington
Environmental Initiative and established the British Columbia-Washington
Environmental Cooperation Council (British Columbia-Washington
Council).60 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement calls for regular
meetings and the creation of subcommittees as necessary and includes a
number of work priorities and preliminary action plans. The AbbotsfordSumas Aquifer, which is located along the US-Canada border, was one of
the listed priorities requiring immediate joint action.
At the fi rst meeting of the British Columbia-Washington Council, the
council created the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer International Task Force to
respond to, and address, the identified issues.61 This taskforce, consisting of
representatives from federal and provincial agencies from both countries,
has mainly focused on issues related to water quality in the aquifer. The
main objectives of the taskforce are to develop a joint groundwater management plan; coordinate efforts aimed at protecting the aquifer; develop
aquifer management strategies using a managerial approach; and facilitate
and coordinate education and public involvement in water management
issues.
In response to the concern for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, British
Columbia and the State of Washington signed in 1996 the Memorandum of
Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications (AbbotsfordSumas MOA).62 The arrangement addresses the referral of water rights
applications ‘within or on the exterior boundaries’ of the Abbotsford-Sumas
Aquifer on both sides of the border. It defines the roles and responsibilities
of the relevant permitting agencies to allow timely prior consultation, comment period, and exchange of information on water quantity allocations
within each party’s territory, which ‘could potentially significantly impact
water quantity on the other side of the border.’ It also provides for the
60 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the Province of British Columbia and
the State of Washington and British Columbia (17 May 1992), <http://www.international
waterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [British Columbia-Washington Agreement].
61 Summary of 1 October 1992 meeting of the British Columbia-Washington Environmental
Cooperation Council, <http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/spd/ecc/docs/borderline_news/meeting92.
pdf>.
62 Memorandum of Agreement Related to Referral of Water Right Applications between
the State of Washington as represented by the Department of Ecology and the Province
of British Columbia as represented by the Minister of Environment, Lands and Parks,
10 October 1996, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>
[Abbotsford-Sumas MOA].
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sharing of studies addressing water availability and the development of
water resources within or on the boundaries of the aquifer. The AbbotsfordSumas MOA specifically applies to all surface water, groundwater, and
reservoir waters.
A third arrangement in this region is the 1995 Interagency Memorandum
of Understanding between the State of Washington Department of Ecology
Eastern Regional Office and the Province of British Columbia Ministry of
Environment, Lands and Parks Kootenay Region (Columbia River MOU).63
This arrangement was designed to ‘assure continued coordination and
cooperation relative to major environmental issues within the international
portion of the Columbia River drainage.’64 While the Columbia River MOU
only mentions groundwater in the scope of work attached to the document,
and only with regard to discharges of effluent, groundwater is implicated
in the Columbia River MOU inasmuch as it is part of the Columbia River
drainage basin. The MOU obligates the parties to: (1) provide timely prior
notification of proposed discharges with potential for cross border water
quality impacts; (2) ‘provide an opportunity for comment on planning
activities that may have trans-boundary impacts’; (3) share environmental
data from the international portion of the Columbia River drainage system;
(4) provide the opportunity to review and comment on projects or activities
with potential to cause cross border impacts; (5) ‘facilitate public information sharing meeting’; and (6) specify contacts to facilitate the timely sharing of information.65
3. Transboundary Arrangements within the United States
A. Interstate Compacts
Interstate compacts are the preferred method for resolving transboundary water disputes in the United States. Compacts are like treaties in
the sense that two sovereign states enter into an agreement over a transboundary resource. All interstate compacts in the United States require
approval by the US Congress.66 In the United States, twenty-six water
allocation compacts are in force, at least four of which include the federal government as a signatory.67 While no interstate compacts focus
exclusively on a transboundary aquifer, a number of the allocation compacts do address interrelated groundwater resources. These include the
63 Interagency Memorandum of Understanding between the State of Washington
Department of Ecology Eastern Regional Office and the Province of British Columbia
Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks Kootenay Region (1995), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Columbia River MOU].
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, para. 10, Clause 3.
67 J. Muyes, G.W. Sherk, and M.C. O’Leary, Utton Transboundary Resources Center Model
Interstate Water Compact 47 Nat. Res. J. 17 at 21 (2007).
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yet-to-be-approved Great Lakes Compact discussed earlier68 as well as
the following arrangements.
The Susquehanna River Basin Compact, which was adopted in 1968 by
New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the United States,69 is one of the
few interstate compacts that treat groundwater equally with surface water
in terms of planning, allocation, and regulation of water use. The 1968
compact defines ‘waters’ as meaning both surface and ground waters within
the drainage area of the Susquehanna River. It states in Article 1.3 that
‘[t]he water resources of the basin are functionally interrelated, and the uses
of these resources are interdependent’ and, therefore, ‘[a] single administrative agency is . . . essential for effective and economical direction, supervision, and coordination of water resources efforts and programs.’70
The 1968 compact also created a commission to assist in implementing
the goals of the compact. Commission approval is required for all transboundary water projects; projects involving diversions of water into or from
the basin; projects that may have a ‘significant effect’ on the water resources
of another state party; and projects that are included within the scope of the
commission’s comprehensive plan for the development of water resources
or that would have a ‘significant effect’ on the commission’s plan. Towards
these objectives, the parties agree to ‘seek enactment of such additional
legislation as will be required to enable’ the commission to accomplish its
obligations and duties.71
In the western United States, Colorado, Kansas, and Nebraska entered
into the Republican River Compact in 1943.72 This compact allocates
the average annual water supply of the Republican River to each state in
specific proportions.73 In 1998, Kansas filed a complaint before the US
Supreme Court alleging that Nebraska had violated the compact by allowing private well owners to pump groundwater hydraulically connected to
the Republican River and its tributaries.74 Kansas claimed Nebraska was
using more water than its allocation under the compact, thus depriving
Kansas of its full entitlement. Colorado was joined in the lawsuit because it
is a party to the compact and the headwaters of the Republican River rise
within Colorado.75
68

See Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91–575, 84 Stat. 1509 (24 December 1970),
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>
[Susquehanna
River Basin Compact].
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Republican River Compact, Pub. L. No. 78–60, 57 Stat. 86 (1943), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Republican River Compact].
73 Ibid.
74 John Hanna, Kansas Demands Nebraska Cut Use of Water from River and Pay Damages
(20 December 2007), <http://climate.weather.com/articles/water122007.html>.
75 Ibid.
69
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Following protracted negotiations, the three states entered into a settlement agreement. Among other things, the states agreed to include in the
count of each state’s allocation groundwater withdrawals that are determined to deplete stream flow in the Republican River or its tributaries.76
The states also agreed: (1) to cooperate on developing a comprehensive
groundwater model; (2) to a moratorium on groundwater development in
the basin upstream of Guide Rock, Nebraska; (3) on a methodology for
determining ‘Virgin Water Supply, Computed Water Supply, Allocations,
Imported Water Supply Credit, augmentation credit and Computed
Beneficial Consumptive Use’; (4) on a process for developing a groundwater
model for the basin; and (5) on a dispute resolution process.77
Unlike the Republican River Compact, which allocated water in proportions, the Arkansas River Compact, signed in 1948 by the states of
Colorado and Kansas, equally allocates the waters of the Arkansas River
and their utilization between the two states.78 It also equally allocates the
benefits arising from the construction, operation, and maintenance of the
then-planned John Martin Reservoir. Article IV-D of the compact provides
that all future development of the Arkansas River Basin must not materially deplete the usable quantity or availability of water in the river to other
users of the river’s waters.79 In 2001, the US Supreme Court interpreted this
provision to include the development of groundwater resources within the
basin.80
The Upper Niobrara River Compact, which was signed in 1962 by the
states of Wyoming and Nebraska, was principally designed to apportion
equitably the surface waters of the Upper Niobrara River Basin.81 However,
the compact also acknowledges that groundwater could become an important source of irrigation water, and, therefore, it established a secondary
objective of compiling and assessing information on ‘groundwater and
underground water flow’ that would assist in the future apportionment
of such waters.82 According to Article VI(a) of the compact, groundwater
would not be apportioned ‘until such time as adequate date [sic] on groundwater of the basin are available.’ Articles VI further provides that to obtain
the necessary data, the two states shall cooperate and shall bear all costs
equally.83
76

Ibid.
Kansas v. Nebraska and Colorado, 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (order approving the fi nal settlement stipulation).
78 Arkansas River Compact, Pub. L. No. 81–82, 63 Stat. 145 (1949), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Arkansas River Compact].
79 Ibid., Article IV-D.
80 Kansas v. Colorado, 121 S.Ct. 2023 (2001).
81 Upper Niobrara River Compact, Pub. L. No. 91–52, 83 Stat. 86 (1969), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [Upper Niobrara River Compact].
82 Ibid., Article I(a).
83 Ibid.
77

Book 1.indb 110

11/18/2008 5:18:17 PM

TR ANSBOU N DA RY GROU N DWATER RESOU RCES

111

B. Congressional Mandate: The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid
Lake Water Settlement Act (Truckee-Carson Act)84
The Truckee River Basin, located in California and Nevada, has been a
source of contention for nearly a century. Demand for the waters of this
basin has often been greater than its supply. As a result, beginning in 1935
with the first Truckee River Agreement, various arrangements were devised
to allocate the waters of the basin.85 In 1990, the US Congress enacted the
Truckee-Carson Act, which equitably allocates the waters of the Truckee
River, Lake Tahoe, and the Carson River between the two states.86 Although
the act primarily focuses on surface water, it recognizes the interrelated
nature of surface and groundwater.
Section 204(a)(5) of the Truckee-Carson Act ensures that both states,
individually or collectively, can study the use of surface water to enable the
conjunctive use of groundwater. Sections 204(b)(1) and 204(c)(1) include
groundwater in the computation of allowable diversions from Lake Tahoe
and the Truckee River, respectively. Moreover, the Act recognizes groundwater as an integral source of freshwater and prioritizes groundwater use
based on the location of extraction. For example, under section 204(c)(1)(C),
any use of groundwater in Nevada, which is extracted from groundwater
related to the Truckee River in California, is subordinate to existing and
future uses of groundwater in California.87
In addition, the Truckee-Carson Act establishes a ‘safe yield’ standard in
the management of groundwater interrelated to the Truckee River Basin. In
section 204(c)(1)(C), the act provides that any use of groundwater in Nevada
shall cease to the extent that it causes extractions to exceed the safe yield as
determined by the United States Geological Survey and California law.88
Furthermore, the Truckee-Carson Act, under section 210(b)(16), requires
the secretary of the US Department of the Interior to ‘undertake appropriate measures to address significant adverse impacts’ on domestic uses of
groundwater that result directly from the water purchases by the Act.89 Such
measures must be in consultation with officials from the state of Nevada and
‘affected local interests.’ The provisions of this Act are to be implemented
by a Truckee River Operating Agreement, which is being developed by the

84 The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101–618 (S 3048)
(1990), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [TruckeeCarson Act].
85 See Truckee River Agreement (13 June 1935), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>; see also J. Kramer, Lake Tahoe, the Truckee River, and
Pyramid Lake: the Past, Present, and Future of Interstate Water Issues 19 Pacific L.J. 1339
(1988).
86 Truckee-Carson Act, supra note 84.
87 Ibid. at sec. 204.
88 Ibid. at sec. 210.
89 Ibid.
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US Department of the Interior and the California Department of Water
Resources.90
C. General Arrangements between US States
Another source of cooperation is that pursued between subnational states.
In the United States, these are unofficial arrangements with no legal implications because they lack congressional approval.91 Nonetheless, such
arrangements are similar to those between subnational units in international
transboundary scenarios.92 For example, the Pullman-Moscow Aquifer
Inter-Agency Agreement between the States of Washington and Idaho
was adopted by the Washington Department of Ecology and the Idaho
Department of Water Resources to promote coordination on the management of the Palouse Basin Aquifer (Palouse Basin Agreement).93 Entered
into on 18 April 1992, this arrangement formalizes the role of the previously organized Palouse Basin Aquifer Committee (PBAC) in managing the
Palouse Basin Aquifer.94 The PBAC has developed a coordinated groundwater management plan that sets goals and action plans for the improved
management of the aquifer. The present arrangement requires the states to
share information on new groundwater allocation permits as well as changes
to old permits and requires that decisions on such requests be guided by the
PBAC’s groundwater management plan. While final authorization remains
with the respective state agencies, the arrangement also requires that all
new permits and proposed change-of-permit applications be submitted to
the PBAC for review, evaluation, and recommendation.
Another interstate groundwater arrangement is the Memorandum of
Agreement for Maintenance and Utilization of the Numerical Model of the
Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer between Idaho Department of
Water Resources and Washington Department of Ecology (SVRP MOA).95
The SVRP MOA offers guidance on how the two states will cooperate on
water supply issues in the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer. It is
90 Federal Register, 10 November 2004 (Volume 69, Number 217). The Federal Register
indicates that the public comments period for the draft agreement closed on 30 December
2004.
91 See note 66 and accompanying text.
92 See, for example, Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
93 Pullman-Moscow Aquifer Inter-Agency Agreement between the States of Washington
and Idaho (18 April 1992), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.
html>. The Palouse Basin Aquifer was formerly identified as the Pullman-Moscow Water
Resources Committee. More information on this acquifer can be found at <http://www.webs.
uidaho.edu/pbac/> [Palouse Basin Agreement].
94 Ibid.
95 Memorandum of Agreement for Maintenance and Utilization of the Numerical
Model of the Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer between Idaho Department of
Water Resources and Washington Department of Ecology (8 October 2007), <http://www.
internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [SVRP MOA].
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based on a jointly developed computer model for groundwater flow that
permits water managers on both sides of the border to enter data about
a proposed withdrawal and determine whether the withdrawal would
affect regional water levels.96 Of note, the MOA establishes a collaborative ‘modeling committee’ of experts from both states who are assigned the
responsibility of managing and securing the computer model and ensuring
that all updates are agreed upon by both sides. The committee also assesses
proposed enhancements to the model as well as the direction of research
intended to enhance the model.97
Along the Atlantic coast, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division
(GA-EPD) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (SC-DHEC) entered into the Letter Agreement between the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division, Department of Natural Resources and
the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control
(Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement) regarding salt-water encroachment in the Hilton Head–Savannah border area on 25 October 1995.98
The agreement details a ten-year program to develop a joint strategy for
addressing groundwater quality and quantity problems in the Floridian
Aquifer, which traverses the border of the two states. The Letter Agreement
indicates that Georgia would develop a groundwater management strategy
and undertake certain groundwater conservation measures to complement similar activities already in place in South Carolina. It also indicates
that the states agree on reducing withdrawals in specific locations on both
sides of the border as a means to address groundwater quality and quantity
issues.99
While the initial arrangement was set for ten years, the states have continued their cooperative efforts in the context of Georgia’s Coastal Sound
Science Initiative (CSSI)100 and have worked with the US Geological
Survey to model the region’s groundwater resources in an effort to determine how best to manage them. In a related matter, the governors of the
two states created in June 2005 a bi-state Savannah River Committee as
a forum for discussing issues of mutual interest related to the waters of
the Savannah River Basin.101 While the two governors’ executive orders
96

97 Ibid.
Ibid.
Letter Agreement between the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, Department
of Natural Resources, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (letter from Georgia dated 29 June 1995, and from South Carolina dated 25 October
1995), <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html> [GeorgiaSouth Carolina Letter Agreement].
99 Ibid.
100 See US General Attorney, Coastal Georgia Sound Science Initiative: Evaluation of
ground-water flow, saltwater contamination and alternative water sources, <http://ga2.
er.usgs.gov/coastal/>.
101 Governor Sonny Perdue, Executive Order on the Creation of the Governor’s Savannah
River Committee of Georgia, signed 21 June 2005, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/
98
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creating the committees do not mention groundwater specifically, the
actions of the committee clearly indicate that groundwater is an important
component of the effort. In October 2007, under the auspices of the committee, representatives of both the GA-EPD and SC-DHEC entered into a
memorandum of agreement whose goal is to refi ne the CSSI mathematical
model and implement it as a means of preventing salt-water intrusion into
the Floridian Aquifer.102 The Memorandum of Agreement between the
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control and the
Georgia Environmental Protection Division creates a Technical Advisory
Committee, composed of representatives of the two agencies and the US
Geological Survey, which is tasked with reviewing and critiquing the model
and identifying new scenarios for the management of the aquifer.103
D. Court Decisions
The North Platt River Settlement Decree of 2001 (2001 Decree) was
imposed by the US Supreme Court on the states of Colorado, Nebraska, and
Wyoming.104 The 2001 Decree resulted from the latest in a series of lawsuits
between the three states over the waters of the North Platt River. In 1945, in
its first decree related to the dispute (1945 Decree), the US Supreme Court
equitably apportioned the North Platte River among Colorado, Nebraska,
and Wyoming.105 In 1986, Nebraska sued Wyoming, claiming that the latter
was unlawfully depleting the waters of the North Platt River in contravention of the 1945 Decree.106
The 1945 Decree focuses exclusively on surface water. This decree, however, recognizes that reservoirs on the North Platte River could lose some
water as a result of ‘ground absorption and storage.’107 Moreover, the 1945
Decree acknowledges that ‘seepage’ was the property of the appropriator
even though the water originated from a surface source and may have previously been used.108 In sharp contrast, the 2001 Decree explicitly recognizes that surface and groundwater resources may be hydraulically related
and, albeit implicitly, that hydraulically related water resources should
Local-GW-Arrangements.html>; Governor mark Sanford, Executive Order on the Creation
of the Governor’s Savannah River Committee of South Carolina, no. 2005–14, signed 21 June
2005, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
102 Memorandum of Agreement between the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control and the Georgia Environmental Protection Division, signed
15 October 2007, <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/Local-GW-Arrangements.html>.
103 See US Geological Survey Project Guide Lines: Simulation of Water Levels, Saltwater
Intrusion, and Water Management Scenarios in the Savannah-Hilton Head Island Area—
Project Period June 2007-March 2009, at 3 (2007) [on fi le with author].
104 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001).
105 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) as modified by the court in Nebraska v.
Wyoming, 345 U.S. 981 (1953).
106 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 479 U.S. 1051 (1987).
107 Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
108 Ibid.
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be managed comprehensively. For example, the 2001 Decree enjoins the
state of Wyoming from diverting water for irrigation purposes from the
North Platte River ‘and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically
connected groundwater wells.’ It further notes that the consumptive use of
irrigation water encompassed under this injunction ‘shall include . . . [w]ater
consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated by water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells.’109
I I I . E M E RG I N G S TAT E PR AC T IC E ?

Although the water resources from the above arrangements range dramatically in location, geology, and use, it is possible to discern a number of
normative commonalities that appear applicable regardless of geography or
local conditions. These include such areas as cooperation, data and information sharing, joint monitoring, public participation, and a preference for
subsidiarity and for developing local solutions for local issues. To the extent
that the appearance of these principles in the various instruments constitutes a trend, they may evidence emerging state practice.
1. Cooperation
One of the most important factors that can determine the success of an
arrangement cannot be found in the text. A large part of water issues are
political. Therefore, the non-tangible goals and attitudes of the parties and
the manner in which they approach the negotiations are vital parts of the
process.110 The arrangement needs to be flexible enough to deal with different situations surrounding shared groundwater but specific enough to
demand the cooperation necessary.111 Some form of cooperation is explicitly
present in almost every one of the earlier listed arrangements. The presence
of an agreement, formal or informal, indicates at least an implicit measure
of cooperation among the parties. Cooperation can be applied to a variety
of groundwater-related issues ranging from the research of a resource to the
management and development and even the protection of an aquifer. It can
require a party to recognize that more than one entity has a right to a water
resource as well as acknowledge the role of water in different cultures and
its importance in spirituality and creating a sense of place.
This obligation is often written as a reflection of the overall purpose of
the arrangement. All of the United States-Mexico arrangements have a
cooperation component related to the use of the particular aquifer as well
as the limits on withdrawal. For example, Minute 242 obligates both parties
109

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 534 U.S. 40 (2001).
V. Bennett and L.A. Herzog, U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional
Change: A Commentary 40 Nat. Resources J. 973 at 976 (2000).
111 D.A. Caponera and D. Alheritiere, Principles for International Groundwater Law 18 Nat.
Resources J. 589 at 591 (1978).
110
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to restrict groundwater withdrawal on both sides of the border within five
miles of the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San Luis,112 while the Juárez-El
Paso MOU obligates the cities of Juárez and El Paso to develop and coordinate a compatible plan ‘to secure water supplies and extend the life of
the Hueco Bolson.’113 In contrast, along the US-Canada border, cooperation appears to be equally concerned with water quality and quantity. For
example, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, the 1995 Columbia River MOU,
the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, and the 2005 Great Lakes Compact
include cooperation requirements related to both groundwater quantity and
quality issues.114
At times, the type of cooperation required appears to be more basic. In
the case of the Great Lakes Charter, the parties agree to cooperate in defining, studying, and managing the resource.115 The 1992 British ColumbiaWashington Agreement requires cooperation in meeting regularly and
coordinating actions in response to shared concerns.116 In other cases, the
obligation to cooperate is implicit. Neither the Georgia-South Carolina
Letter Agreement nor the Georgia-South Carolina MOA explicitly mandate
cooperation between the parties. Yet, the two arrangements are built on
the understanding that they must cooperate if they are to accomplish their
objectives.117
Whether or not an arrangement explicitly specifies cooperation, it is a
critical part of any successful accord to share a resource. In its absence,
other objectives will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. Although
112

Minute 242, supra note 20 at para. 5.
Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 at para. 3(e).
114 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 37 (discussing International Joint Commission
approval of future diversions and other activities with possible transboundary affect in
Articles III and IV, cooperation on Niagara River water levels above the falls in Article V,
and cooperation in the apportionment of the St. Mary and Milk Rivers and their tributaries in Article VI; also discussing an agreement not to cause pollution resulting in injury of
health or property to the other party in Article IV); 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note
63 (recognizing in the MOU and Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU that the
parties ‘mutually agree to’ cooperate over new discharges and consumptive uses); 2005 Great
Lakes Agreement, supra note 50 (specifying the agreed-upon requirements on existing and
new diversions and withdrawals in Articles 200–3 and 205 and those relating to water quality
in Articles 201 and 203); 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 (regulating diversions and
withdrawals in Articles 4.8–4.11 and 4.14; creating an inventory of water data related to existing quantities and proposed withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses, as well as reporting requirements for certain withdrawals, diversions and consumptive uses in Article 4.1,
and describing water conservation and efficiency requirements in Article 4.2; imposing some
criteria on water quality in Article 4.9 for water returned or introduced into the basin, and
conditioning withdrawals on ensuring remaining water quality in Article 4.11).
115 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45 (providing in Principle II that the parties
‘recognize and commit to a spirit of cooperation . . . in the study, monitoring, planning, and
conservation of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin’).
116 1992 British Columbia-Washington Agreement, supra note 60, at attached terms of
reference and preliminary action plan/work priorities.
117 See generally notes 98–103 in this article and accompanying text.
113
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working together is a necessary component of any successful arrangement,
sometimes more proactive obligations must also be present.
2. Prior Notification of Planned Activities
A logical extension of cooperation is advance notification of activity
by one party that may adversely affect the other parties who share the
water source.118 Within this requirement is a range of compliance alternatives. Some of the arrangements reviewed require mere notification of the
activity, while others impose more stringent criteria and require additional
procedures for informing another state of planned activities.
Minute 242 is an example of the most basic consultation arrangement
simply requiring the parties in paragraph 6 to consult each other prior to
new development of water resources or any action that would adversely
impact the other party.119 The Great Lakes Charter offers more detailed
obligations in the section on implementation of principles and consultation
procedures by requiring notification of all relevant provinces and states
prior to ‘any new or increased diversion or consumptive use’ in excess of
5,000,000 gallons and specifies opportunities for objecting to, and consulting over, such proposals.120 Its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement
also calls for prior notice and commenting opportunities in Article 205
for certain new and increase-in-use applications.121 In the case of the
Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, the arrangement calls on the relevant permitting agencies to provide a comment period to their counterparts across the
border before approving a water quantity allocation.122 In a somewhat different approach, the 1995 Columbia River MOU allows for timely consultation but, unlike the other arrangements, also incorporates an opportunity
for ‘transboundary public comment.’123
3. Sharing of Data and Information
In order to protect a resource, it must first be understood. The realization that a shared water arrangement is necessary often predates the full
understanding of the resource. For this reason, a common aspect of state
practice involves the sharing of data and information between users of a
118 This and many of the other principles discussed in this article are well recognized in the
international law of transboundary resources, which lends support to their application in the
context of shared groundwater resources.
119 Minute 242, supra note 20, at para. 6.
120 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45 at ‘Implementation of Principles: Consultation
Procedures.’
121 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 50.
122 Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62, at sec. 2 on Scope of Work attached to the
MOA.
123 1995 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63 (requiring in the MOU for timely notification and commenting opportunities for proposed new discharges as well as for proposed new
consumptive uses as described in detail in Article III(a) and (b) of Attachment 1 to the MOU
on Scope of Work).
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shared water resource. Common data collection includes water quality testing, aquifer modeling, monitoring water table levels, and aquifer mapping.
The particulars of what is incorporated into the data collection provision
is dependent on local specifics, but its presence, in some form, is critical to
continued understanding and prudent stewardship.
Data collection can be necessary to create specific use regulations
or it can be part of ongoing operation and maintenance. An arrangement written in the early stages of resource development may be more
expansive. In the Republican River Compact, three states agreed to
the development of a comprehensive model of the relationship between
aquifer withdrawals and the Republican River. In other locations, where
research has already taken place, data collection may be less inclusive or
specific. For example, in El Paso, Texas, the Hueco Bolson Aquifer has
been heavily studied and modeled in an effort to gain accurate future
water availability estimates. However, in the MOU between the local
water utilities on either side of the border, both parties agree to share
any newly gained information regarding transboundary water resources.
To a limited extent, the US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Act contemplates expanding existing arrangements related to archiving
and sharing relevant data.124
Provisions for joint sharing of data and information also can be found
in a number of arrangements focusing on the US-Canada border. The 1978
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement includes a biennial meeting to share
monitoring data provided by both parties. The 1985 Great Lakes Charter
recognizes joint monitoring of the water resources in the second principle,
which focuses on cooperation. This mandate is later expanded by a description of a joint database ‘and the establishment of systematic arrangements
for the exchange of water data and information.’125 Unlike other arrangements, detailed information is provided about the form and type of data
that must be supplied as part of monitoring efforts.
The Great Lakes Compact provides that a chief purpose of the compact
is ‘[t]o facilitate the exchange of data, strengthen the scientific information base upon which decisions are made and engage in consultation on
the potential effects of proposed Withdrawals and losses on the Waters and
Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin.’126 Similarly, parties to
the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA must ‘cooperate in sharing relevant water
quantity information necessary to provide management of those water
resources.’127 The arrangement between the cities of El Paso and Ciudad
124 See US-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, supra note 31 at
Article 4(b)(2)(B).
125 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45.
126 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 at Article 1.3(2)(e).
127 Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62.
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Juarez also recognizes the history of, and implicates the continued need for,
shared technical information about the Hueco Bolson Aquifer.128
4. Public Participation
The inclusion of the public is paramount to achieving success in any shared
use arrangement. True participation means that no one is excluded from
participation in the decision-making processes and institutions necessary
for human survival and fulfilment, including those relating to water. ‘Public
involvement holds the promise of improving the management of international
watercourses and reducing the potential for conflict over water issues.’129
Participation improves the quality of decisions, facilitates the decisionmaking process, improves credibility, and enhances implementation.130
A number of the documents reviewed explicitly list public participation as a condition of the arrangement. For example, the second directive of the Great Lakes Charter Annex specifically calls for the governors
and premiers to commit to a process that ensures public input. The 1995
Columbia River MOU provides the public an ‘opportunity to review and
comment in writing or verbally on a proposal under consideration by the
agency with jurisdiction.’131 The Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement
is more specific, requiring public meetings and hearings to establish a
‘Coastal Groundwater Management Strategy.’132 Public meetings with
sufficient notice are also a condition of the Susquehanna River Basin
Commission.133
Often, some arrangements do not overtly call for public participation but,
rather, incorporate public participation opportunities through other defined
processes. For example, the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer has an active stakeholder group that includes concerned citizens as well as representatives
from federal, provincial, and local government agencies.134 The Truckee
River has a comparable watershed council.135 Domestic legal requirements
can also promote participation by requiring public dissemination of proposed projects with opportunities for public comment. The SVRP MOA,
for example, requires the Model Committee, which is organized by the
ldaho Department of Water Resources in conjunction with the Washington
Department of Ecology, to establish protocols and procedures for publicly
128

Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25.
Carl Bruch et al., From Theory to Practice: An Overview of Approaches to Involving the
Public in International Watershed Management, in Carl Bruch et al., eds., Public Participation
in the Governance of International Freshwater Resources, 3 at 3 (2005).
130 Ibid. at 6.
131 Columbia River MOU, supra note 63.
132 Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, supra note 98.
133 Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 69, Article 15.4.
134 Discover Abbotsford, <http://www.abbotsford.ca/Page133.aspx>.
135 See Truckee River Watershed Council, <http://www.truckeeriverwc.org/>.
129
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disseminating updated versions of the groundwater flow model of the
Spokane Valley-Rathdrum Prairie Aquifer.136 In addition, US interstate
compacts adopted by US state legislatures, such as those on the Arkansas
and Republican rivers, are subject to domestic state procedures, which
typically include public hearings and comment opportunities. Although it
is more effective to ensure participation by specifically including it in an
arrangement, such secondary opportunities can still encourage involvement
by interested stakeholders.
5. Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity suggests that social decision making ought to
be handled by the lowest level of competent authority.137 It emphasizes a
bottom-up approach and contends that those with the greatest interest in
the resolution of a problem are best suited to respond to the problem.138
In consequence, the principle reflects a presumption for a decentralization
of decision making.139 Accordingly, subsidiarity is justified on the grounds
that ‘decentralized decisions generally, but not always, will be better
informed, will better reflect the values and preferences of those affected,
will be more adaptable to improving knowledge and changing circumstances, and will lead to better results in terms of maintaining a sustainable
human environment.’140 Another advantage relates to the degree of agility
with which local officials can respond to a water challenge as compared to
officials at higher and more distant levels of government.
While the nations of North America do not formally subscribe to the principle of subsidiarity by name, the concepts of federalism in all three countries do reflect significant deference to subnational decision-making bodies.
As a result, a de facto system of subsidiarity arguably exists for addressing
transboundary groundwater resources on the continent. The majority of
the documents examined in this study evidence a pattern of local authorities tackling local groundwater challenges without involving the national
governments of the respective nations. Significantly, such initiatives were
taken at various levels of local and regional government. The Juárez-El
Paso MOU, for example, represents an effort taken at the lowest political
level—the public water utilities of El Paso and Ciudad Juárez—in an effort
to address the challenges posed by the transboundary utilization of the
136

See SVRP MOA, supra note 95 at 1(d).
See R.K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution 35 Ind.
L. Rev. 103 at 142 (2001) (noting that ‘subsidiarity, at its core, envisions a society in which
problems are solved and decisions made from the bottom up’); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity
as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 38 at 42 (2003).
138 J.L.
Huffman, Making Environmental Regulations More Adaptive through
Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1377 at 1381–2 (2004).
139 Ibid. at 1381.
140 Ibid. at 1378 [emphasis in original].
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Hueco Bolson Aquifer.141 The British Columbia-Washington Agreement,
the Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, and the Columbia River MOU also constitute examples of a de facto system of subsidiarity, albeit at a higher level
of authority. All three arrangements were pursued and implemented at
the state and province levels for the purpose of addressing transboundary
groundwater resources along the border between Washington State and the
province of British Columbia.142 The same can be said of the Great Lakes
Charter and its progeny, the 2005 Great Lakes Agreement and 2005 Great
Lakes Compact.143
Within the United States, subsidiarity appears to be more officially
sanctioned to the extent that the US Constitution reserves to the states
all power and authority not delegated to the federal government or prohibited by the Constitution.144 Thus, the various compacts between US
states considered in this article represent more of a de jure system of subsidiarity, albeit with some national oversight in the guise of congressional
approval.145 To a similar extent, the Palouse Basin Agreement, the SVRP
MOA, the Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, and Georgia-South
Carolina MOA also constitute examples of subsidiarity in the context of
addressing transboundary groundwater resources.146 However, since they
do not require congressional approval, they might be classified as examples
of de facto subsidiarity.
I V. T H E S IG N I F IC A N C E OF L O C A L A R R A N G E M E N T S

Of the seventeen documents reviewed in this article that address international
transboundary aquifers, only five constitute official international agreements: Minutes 242 and 289 of the IBWC, the La Paz Agreement between the
US and Mexico, the US-Canadian 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, and 1978
Great Lakes Agreement.147 Of these, only Minute 242 directly addresses
transboundary aquifer issues. While the other international instruments do
141

See discussion of the Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See discussion of the British Columbia-Washington Agreement, supra note 60,
Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 63, and Columbia River MOU, supra notes 63, and
accompanying text for all.
143 See discussion of the Great Lakes Charter, supra note 45, 2005 Great Lakes Agreement,
supra note 50, and 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 56 and accompanying text for all.
144 U.S. Constitution, amend. X. See D.W. Kmiec, Liberty Misconceived: Hayek’s Incomplete
Relationship Between Natural and Customary Law 40 Am. J. Juris. 209 at 215 (1995) (portraying subsidiarity as a component of the Tenth Amendment).
145 See discussion of the Arkansas River Compact, supra note 78, Republican River
Compact, supra note 72, Susquehanna River Basin Compact, supra note 69, and Upper
Niobrara River Compact, supra note 81, and accompanying text for all.
146 See discussion of the Palouse Basin Agreement, supra note 92, SVRP MOU, supra
note 94, and Georgia-South Carolina Letter Agreement, supra note 97, and accompanying
text for all.
147 Official international agreements here are understood as agreements between nations.
142
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contemplate cross-border groundwater resources, they do so very indirectly
and only as a secondary or tertiary concern.
Of the remaining twelve instruments, as well as the six US compacts
reviewed, all can be construed as either unofficial international (meaning
that they are not formally recognized by the respective sovereigns) arrangements or subnational transboundary arrangements. As such, they are not
binding under international law and provide little if any evidence of international law or obligations. Yet, all of these arrangements are noteworthy
because, to varying extents, all of them directly address groundwater issues
that traverse political boundaries. Two complementary conclusions can be
drawn from this fact.
The first suggests that the countries of North America have found it more
practical to manage transboundary aquifers at the local, rather than at the
national, level. Although similar in concept to the principle of subsidiarity
discussed earlier,148 it is not based on political or social interests. Rather,
it is a function of practicality and is readily understood when considering
the appropriateness of a global versus a local approach to the management
of freshwater resources in general. While global framework agreements for
transboundary water resources may yet prove to be functional,149 detailed
global arrangements are probably ineffective and inappropriate primarily
because the circumstances and conditions of each transboundary water
body make it globally unique. Aquifers often affect a restricted community with individual concerns.150 Geologic, hydrologic, and climatic characteristics, as well as distinctive social, developmental, cultural, and other
factors, often require very specific considerations of local circumstances.
Moreover, although concerns addressed in disparate regions may appear
facially similar, the water challenge in each is typically locally unique necessitating locally tailored solutions.151
148

See discussion of subsidiarity in notes 137–46 in this article and accompanying text.
For example, while the 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, a framework convention, has not yet come into force, state
practice suggests that it has influenced the development of various regional agreements. See
G. Eckstein, Development of International Water Law and the UN Watercourse Convention,
in A.R. Turton and R. Henwood, eds, Hydropolitics in the Developing World: A Southern
African Perspective 81 at 88–9 (2002). Similarly, in its current effort to formulate international legal principles applicable to transboundary aquifers, the UN International Law
Commission has sought to develop principles that apply only generally to all transboundary
aquifers and that provide states with a framework for more specific aquifer agreements tailored to each aquifer’s and region’s unique traits. Cf. Eckstein, supra note 2 at 608.
150 See, for example, Hector M. Arias, International Groundwaters: The Upper San Pedro
River Basin Case 40 Nat. Resources J. 199 (2000).
151 It is noteworthy that this ‘bottom-up’ approach, although typically successful, may not
be appropriate in all situations. See Huffman, supra note 138 at 1381: ‘Only where the lower
bodies prove ineffective should the federal government become involved.’ See R.K. Vischer,
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution 35 Ind. L. Rev. 103 (2001).
Factors and characteristics, such as the geographic scale of a transboundary aquifer, for
149
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The majority of arrangements discussed in this article illustrate the advantages of a regional approach. They address local concerns in a way that is
both reflective of, and responsive to, local and regional cultures, knowledge,
needs, and capabilities. For example, the management techniques and allocation regimes employed for the Hueco Bolson Aquifer underlying the city of
El Paso in Texas, United States, and Ciudad Juarez, in Chihuahua, Mexico,
is entirely inappropriate for the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer found along the
border between the US state of Washington and the Canadian province of
British Columbia. While the first is an alluvial aquifer located in an arid
climate with a rapidly growing population, where the aquifer serves as one
of the few sources of water for the entire region, the latter is a mostly unconfined aquifer composed of uncompacted glacial sands and gravels in a more
temperate climate.152 In these two examples, local officials were best able to
determine the appropriate mechanism for their unique water challenges. In
the case of the Hueco Bolson Aquifer, the municipal utility companies of
the bordering sister cities of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez responded to their
unique water challenge by entering into a memorandum of understanding
that focuses on cooperation and the exchange of information.153 In the case
of the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, a series of arrangements were forged at
the state and provincial level discussing the roles and interaction of relevant
permitting agencies and providing for consultation and the exchange of
information, as well as creating a joint task force to develop, among others,
a joint management plan and aquifer management strategies.154
The second conclusion that may be derived from the fact that all of
the arrangements directly address groundwater issues traversing political boundaries is that, to the extent that these pacts indicate how nations
behave in relation to such resources, they may be considered as evidence
for the development of customary international law. An assessment of the
twelve unofficial international arrangements suggests that the countries of
North America allow subnational political units to enter into arrangements
example, may dictate the level of administrative authority necessary to respond to the issues
and challenges posed. Thus, where an aquifer or aquifer basin at issue is contained within a
limited region, local control of decision-making may suffice. However, where the water challenge involves an aquifer or aquifer basin that transects a much larger area, a local arrangement may be less effective and appropriate.
152 United States Department of the Interior, Simulated Ground-Water Flow in the
Hueco Bolson, an Alluvial-Basin Aquifer System near El Paso, Texas 1(4) Water Resources
Investigations Report 02–4108 (2003); Jacek Scibek and Diana M. Allen, Modeled Climate
Change Impacts in the Abbotsford-Sumas Aquifer, Central Fraser Lowland of BC, Canada
and Washington State, 1–2 Proceedings of the 2005 Puget Sound Georgia Basin Research
Conference, <http://www.engr.washington.edu/epp/psgb/2005psgb/2005proceedings/Papers/
E3_SCIBE.pdf>.
153 See Juárez-El Paso MOU, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
154 See Abbotsford-Sumas MOA, supra note 62 and accompanying text.

Book 1.indb 123

11/18/2008 5:18:18 PM

124

Y EA RBOOK OF I N TERNATIONAL EN V IRONMEN TAL LAW

addressing transboundary aquifers. At the very least, it suggests that the
countries overlook such conduct. In either case, the result is state practice for the purpose of determining customary international law, which,
in this case, might be interpreted as a preference by the nations of North
America for local solutions to transboundary groundwater issues. A similar
conclusion can be derived from a review of the six US compacts presented
earlier.155
V. C ON C LU S ION

The growing reliance on local and regional agreements for addressing
water challenges posed by transboundary groundwater resources in North
America indicates a trend in how various levels of government respond
to such challenges. Local and regional authorities are no longer waiting
for the national governments to exercise jurisdiction over transboundary
shared aquifers. Rather, they are negotiating and dealing with their water
challenges on their own and at their own levels of authority. At the same
time, though, the national governments of North America seem to ignore,
if not tolerate, such conduct. This approach appears to differ somewhat
from the European experience where local authorities have explicit authority to enter into cross-border arrangements under the European Outline
Convention.156 Nonetheless, the fact that so many of these arrangements
are concluded at the local level certainly suggests the development of state
practice in North America on the subject. Moreover, it indicates that transboundary groundwater resources are a legitimate subject for international
cooperation.
Many of the principles shared by the various North American arrangements discussed in this article are well-recognized aspects of international
law and those of transboundary resources generally. These principles are
now applied in the groundwater context at a regional level. To the extent
that such arrangements represent state practice, they may evidence evolving
customary international law in the field. Moreover, both the formats of these
agreements and the included normative commonalities can be construed
as contributing to such development. To some extent, this may be a trend
155 While interstate arrangements between subnational political units do not necessarily provide evidence of international state practice, they can, at the very least, be
instructive because the issues addressed between the units sharing an aquifer are virtually identical to those experienced among nations sharing an aquifer. Moreover,
applying national legal constructs to international law is not unique. For example, the
internationally accepted ‘equitable and reasonable utilization’ norm evolved from the
‘equitable apportionment’ principle developed the by US Supreme Court in its settlement
of interstate disputes among US states. See S.C. McCaffrey, The Law of International
Watercourses, at 305 (2001).
156 See European Outline Convention, supra note 10 and accompanying text.

Book 1.indb 124

11/18/2008 5:18:18 PM

TR ANSBOU N DA RY GROU N DWATER RESOU RCES

125

by omission—meaning that by staying out of the arrangements achieved
at the local and regional levels, the national governments have acted in a
manner that establishes state practice. Regardless, this trend should not be
ignored. Moreover, the appropriateness and applicability of the principles
at the heart of this trend should be considered seriously in the context of
other transnational groundwater situations. Considering the experiences
and results of the arrangements discussed in this article, these principles
may serve as effective tools for successfully managing shared groundwater
resources.
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